Databases and other transaction-processing systems use concurrency control and recovery algorithms to ensure that transactions are atomic (i.e., serializable and recoverable). We present a new algorithm based on locking that permits more concurrency than existing commutativity-based algorithms. The algorithm exploits type-specific properties of objects; necessary and sufficient constraints on lock conflicts are derived directly from a data type specification. In addition, the algorithm permits operations to be both partial and nondeterministic, and it permits the lock mode for an operation to be determined by its results as well as its name and arguments. We give a complete formal description of the algorithm, encompassing both concurrency control and recovery, and prove that the algorithm satisfies hybrid atomicity, a local atomicity property that combines aspects of static and dynamic atomic algorithms. We also show that the algorithm is optimal in the sense that no hybrid atomic locking scheme can permit more concurrency.
INTRODUCTION
Atomic transactions are a widely accepted mechanism for coping with failures and concurrency in database systems, both distributed and centralized. Many algorithms have been proposed for concurrency control and recovery [l] . Early work in this area considered only untyped objects: operations were either left uninterpreted, or were treated simply as reads or writes. More recent work has focused on typed objects, such as queues, directories, or counters, that provide a richer set of operations. Several algorithms have been proposed to enhance concurrency and recovery by exploiting data objects' type-specific properties [2, 17, 25, 301 . Most of HERLIHY AND WEIHL these algorithms are locking schemes in which conflicts are governed by some notion of commutativity: lock modes for commuting operations do not conflict. This paper presents a new locking algorithm for concurrency control and recovery of typed data objects. As discussed below, our algorithm permits more concurrency than many type-specific locking schemes in the literature [2, 6, 17, 25 , 301: our algorithm places fewer constraints on lock conflicts, thus permitting a larger set of interleavings. Moreover, our algorithm is "upwardly compatible" with these other schemes in the sense that they can be used together in the same system without jeapordizing serializability or recovery.
In most of the type-specific algorithms in the literature, lock conflicts are governed by some notion of commutativity: if two operations commute, their locks need not conflict. Informally, this condition arises in conventional two-phase locking schemes as follows. If two transactions attempt to acquire conflicting locks, one must wait for the other to complete. The induced delay ensures that the latter is serialized before the former. Two-phase locking thus determines transaction serialization up to a partial order: transactions unrelated by the transitive closure of this lock conflict relation may be serialized in an arbitrary order. Moreover, such unrelated transactions may be serialized in different orders at different data objects, or at different sites in a distributed system. If the operations of concurrent transactions commute, then all such local orderings are equivalent and compatible with a global total serialization ordering.
The basic idea behind our algorithm is quite simple. Transactions are serializable in the order they commit. As part of each transaction's commitment protocol, it generates a timestamp from a logical clock, and distributes that timestamp to the objects it updated.' Our algorithm augments the implicit partial order induced by lock conflicts with the explicit total order induced by transactions' commit timestamps. By making the serialization order explicit, we can replace the commutativity requirement with a weaker notion, which we call dependency. For example, our algorithms permit concurrent transactions to enqueue on a FIFO queue, even though the enqueue operations do not commute.
Our algorithm is quite general: it works for arbitrary data types, including types with partial and non-deterministic operations. Our treatment is systematic: necessary and sufficient conditions for locks to conflict are derived by analyzing the object's data type specification. We give a formal characterization of our notion of conflict, and we prove that our algorithm is correct. Because concurrency control and recovery interact in subtle ways, our descriptions and proofs encompass both concurrency and recovery.
Section 2 defines our model of computation, and Section 3 gives a formal delinition of atomicity. Section 4 describes our criteria for lock conflict, and Section 5 describes our algorithm and proves it correct. Section 6 discusses some pragmatic issues. Finally, Section 7 closes with a discussion and summary. ' These commit timestamps should not be confused with the timestamps used in multiversion algorithms such as Reed's 1241, in which transactions are serialized in a statically predefined order.
MODEL OF COMPUTATION
Our model of computation [30, 333 has two kinds of entities: transactions and objects. Each object provides operations that can be called by transactions to examine and modify the object's state. These operations constitute the sole means by which transactions can access the state of the object. We typically use the symbols P, Q, and R for transactions, and X, Y, and Z for objects.
Our model of computation is event-based, focusing on the events at the interface between transactions and objects. There are four kinds of events of interest: l Invocation events, denoted (inv, X, P), occur when a transaction P invokes an operation of object X. The "in? field includes both the name of the operation and its arguments. Response events, denoted (res, X, P), occur when an object returns a response res to an earlier invocation by transaction P of an operation of object X. l Commit events, denoted (commit(t), X, P), occur when object X learns that transaction P has committed with timestamp t. Timestamps are taken from a countable, totally ordered set.
. Abort events, denoted (abort, X, P), occur when object X learns that transaction P has aborted.
We refer to commit and abort events collectively as compfetion events. We say that event (e, X, P ) involves X and P.
We introduce some notation here. The symbol " l " denotes concatenation of sequences, and the symbol /i denotes the empty sequence. If H is a sequence of events and X is a set of objects, we define H 1 X ("H restricted to x") to be the subsequence of H consisting of the events involving objects in X. If P is a set of transactions, we define H 1 P similarly. If X is an object and P is a transaction, we write HIX for HI {Xl, and H 1 P for H 1 (P}. We define committed(H) to be the set of transactions for which commit events occur in H, and aborted(H) to be the set of transactions for which abort events occur. We also define completed(H) to be committed(H) u aborted(H), the set of transactions that commit or abort in H.
Not all sequences of events make sense as computations. For example, a transaction should not commit at some objects and abort at others, or commit with different timestamps at different objects. To capture these constraints, we introduce a set of well-formedness constraints. A well-formed sequence of events is called a history. We divide our well-formedness constraints into two parts: constraints on the execution of individual transactions, and constraints on the timestamps that can appear in commit events. Individual transactions are constrained as follows:
l Each transaction P must wait for the response to its last invocation before invoking the next operation, and an object can generate a response for P only if P has a pending invocation. More precisely, let op-events(H/P) be the subsequence of HERLIHY AND WEIHL H I P consisting of all invocation and response events; op-events(H 1 P) must consist of an alternating sequence of invocation and response events, beginning with an invocation event. In addition, an invocation event and the immediately succeeding response event must involve the same object.
. l Each transaction P can commit or abort in H, but not both; i.e., committed (H 1 P) n aborted(H 1 P) = 0. l A transaction P cannot commit if it is waiting for the response to an invocation, and cannot invoke any operations after it commits. More precisely, if P ~committed(H 1 P), then H (P consists of op-events(H 1 P) followed by some number of commit events, and op-events (H I P) ends in a response event.
These restrictions on transactions are intended to model the typical use of transactions in existing systems. A transaction executes by invoking operations on objects, receiving responses when the operations finish. We disallow concurrency within a transaction, so that a transaction is permitted at most one pending invocation at any time.* After receiving a response from all invocations, a transaction can commit at one or more objects. A transaction is not allowed to commit at some objects and abort at others; this requirement, called atomic commitment, can be implemented using well-known commitment protocols [9, 19, 26 1. One must be careful not to read more into the above restrictions than is actually written. We have tried to impose as few restrictions as possible. Thus, for example, we allow a transaction to commit at an object without performing any operations at the object. Similarly, a transaction can also commit more than once at the same object. We also do not require a transaction to commit or abort everywhere eventually; such liveness requirements may be important for practical reasons (though perhaps difficult to implement in the presence of communication failures), but are not needed for describing or proving the correctness of our algorithm.
There are three additional constraints on the timestamps in commit events. The first two simply state that the timestamps chosen for transactions are unique, and that a transaction chooses only one timestamp. The third constraint is needed for an algorithm to be able to generate responses to 2 Our belief is that concurrency is best introduced using nested transactions, as in Argus [20] and Camelot [27] . The results in this paper are easily generalized to the model of nested transactions in [7] , which permits a transaction to have concurrent subtransactions. They could also be phrased in terms of the models in [23, 31 , which allow a transaction to invoke concurrent operations.
invocations online. Hybrid atomic algorithms, such as the one in this paper, ensure that the committed transactions are serializable in the order of their timestamps. Since timestamps are chosen when transactions commit, however, an object does not know what timestamp will be chosen by a transaction when the object returns a response to an operation invoked by the transaction. Without some constraints on the timestamp generation method, objects could not generate responses to invocations online. Thus, we impose the following constraint: if a transaction Q executes at an object X after a transaction P has committed at X, then Q's timestamp must be later than that of P.
To state this constraint more precisely, we introduce the following defmitions.3 If H is an event sequence involving one or several objects, define precedes(H) to be the following relation on transactions: (P, Q) E precedes(H) if and only if there exists an operation invoked by Q that returns a response after P commits in H. (The relation precedes (H) captures potential "information flow" between transactions: if (P, Q) E precedes(H), then some operation executed by Q occurred in H after P committed; hence Q may have acquired a lock released by P, which would imply that Q must be serializable after P.) Now, let KS(H) be the partial order on transactions defined by (P, Q) E TS(H) if P and Q commit in H and the timestamp for P is less than the timestamp for Q. We require the timestamp generation method to satisfy the following constraint: the timestamp order on committed transactions must be consistent with the precedes order at each object. Formally, precedes (H 1 X) G TS(H) for all objects X. Informally, this constraint requires that if Q runs at X and sees that P has already committed, then Q must choose a timestamp greater than that of P. This constraint is satisfied by timestamp generation algorithms based on logical clocks [ 181, and by algorithms that piggyback timestamp information on the messages of a commit protocol.
We place few restrictions on aborted transactions; for example, a transaction can continue to invoke operations after it has aborted. We have two reasons for avoiding additional restrictions. First, we have no need for them in our analysis. Second, and more important, additional restrictions might be too strong to model systems with orphans [S, 221, and we would like our results to be as generally applicable as possible.
We note that the definitions (e.g., of precedes) in this section and the next apply to arbitrary histories, except where otherwise stated. In many cases, however, we apply them later in the paper to histories involving only a single object. The generality of the definitions is largely to retain consistency with other work based on the same definitions. Notice that if H is a history, so is H 1 X; thus a definition involving an arbitrary history H can also be applied to H 1 X. ' The definitions of precedes and TS are introduced here as part of defining well-formedness, but are also used in later sections.
In this section we define atomicity and several related properties. The definitions are abstracted from [30, 331 . Unlike many earlier models that classify operations only as reads or writes, our model emphasizes abstraction, in particular data abstraction. Atomicity is defined in terms of objects' specifications, so that transactions are atomic if their execution appears to be serializable and recoverable to transactions, given only the specifications of the objects. For example, a system may be atomic at one level of abstraction and non-atomic at lower levels.
Specifications
Each object has a serial specification, which defines its behavior in the absence of concurrency and failures. An object's serial specification is a set of operation sequences. An operation is a pair consisting of an invocation and a matching response. In addition, an operation identifies the object on which it is executed. We often speak informally of an "operation" on an object, as in "the enq operation on a queue object." An operation in our formal model is intended to represent a single execution of an "operation" as used in the informal sense. For example, the following might be an operation (in the formal sense) on a queue object X:
This operation represents an execution of the Enq operation of X with argument "3" and response "Ok." For brevity, we often say that an operation sequence is legal if it belongs to the serial specification currently of interest.
We also assume that an object's serial specification is prefix-closed, which means that if g is a prefix of h and h is legal, then g is also legal.
Each object also has a behavioral specljication, which characterizes its behavior in the presence of concurrency and failures. An object's behavioral specification is just a set of histories that contain events involving that object only. An implementation of an object is correct if it permits only histories in the object's behavioral specification. If the implementation of each object in a system is correct, then if H is a history of the system, H 1 X is in the behavioral specification of X for each X. (Similar constraints are imposed by other event-based models, such as the input/output automaton model of Lynch and Tuttle [21] .)
Global Atomicity
Informally, a history of a system is atomic if the committed transactions in the history can be executed in some serial order and have the same effect. In order to exploit type-specific properties, we need to define serializability and atomicity in terms of the serial specifications of objects. We say that a serial failure-free history H is acceptable at X if OpSeq(H 1 X) is an element of the serial specification of X; in other words, if the sequence of operations in H involving X is permitted by the serial specification of X. A serial failure-free history is acceptable if it is acceptable at every object X.
Two histories H and K are equivalent if every transaction performs the same sequence of steps in each, i.e., if HIP = K 1 P for every transaction P. If H is a history and T is a total order on transactions, we define Serial(H, T) to be the serial history equivalent to H in which transactions appear in the order T. Thus, if P,, . . . . P, are the transactions in H in the order T, then Serial(H, T) = HIP,* ... *HIP,.
Let T be a total ordering of transactions. A failure-free history H is serializable in the order T if Serial(H, T) is acceptable. In other words, H is serializable in the order T if, according to the serial specifications of the objects, it is permissible for the transactions in H, when run in the order T, to execute the same steps as in H. We say that a failure-free history H is serializable if there exists a total order T on transactions such that H is serializable in the order T. Now 
The history contains only committed transactions, and is serializable in the order Q followed by P followed by R. Note that whether a history is serializable or atomic does not depend on the relative order of operations for different transactions in the history. In most other work on concurrency control (e.g., [23, 3] ), this order of operations is all that matters in determining whether a history is serializable. The difference here is that this other work typically represents operations using only invocations (where the operations are assumed to be "executed" atomically in the order in which the invocations appear in the history), so the order of the invocations is needed to determine the responses of each operation. (And a different model is needed for multi-version algorithms, as in [ 161.) By including more information in the history, we avoid having to make assumptions about the state used to execute each operation.
Local Atomicity
The definition of atomicity given above is global: it applies to a history of an entire system. To build systems in a modular, extensible fashion, it is important to define local properties of objects that guarantee a desired global property such as atomicity. A local atomicity property is a property P of specifications of objects such that the following is true: if the specification of every object in a system satisfies P, then every history in the system's behavior is atomic. The design of a local atomicity property must ensure that the objects agree on at least one serialization order for the committed transactions. This problem can be difficult because each object has only local information; no object has complete information about the global computation of the system. As illustrated in [30, 331 , if different objects use "correct" but incompatible concurrency control methods, non-serializable executions can result. A local atomicity property describes how objects agree on a serialization order for committed transactions.
In this section we define a particular local atomicity property, which we call hybrid atomicity. This local atomicity property uses the timestamps chosen when transactions commit to constrain each object's local serialization order. The idea is that each object ensures that the committed transactions are serializable in timestamp order. More formally, we say that a history H is hybrid atomic if permanent(H) is serializable in the order TS(H). (Note that TS(H) defines a total order on committed(H).)
An object is hybrid atomic if every history in its behavioral specification is hybrid atomic. Hybrid atomicity is a local atomicity property [ 30, 31: THEOREM 1. If every object in a system is hybrid atomic, then every history in the system's behavior is atomic.
As an aside, we remark that hybrid atomicity is an optimal local atomicity property: no strictly weaker local property suflices to ensure global atomicity [30, 331. 
Online Hybrid Atomicity
Our algorithm is pessimistic: it permits an active transaction to commit whenever it is not executing an operation. The notion of online hybrid atomicity captures this property.
If H is a history and C is a set of transactions, we say that C is a commit set for H if committed(H)sC and C naborted(H) = 0. In other words, C is a set of transactions that have already committed or might commit. Now, if H is a history, define Known(H) = Precedes(H) u TS(H). Known(H 1 X) captures what X "knows" about the timestamp order on all transactions, both committed and active. Each object must then be prepared for active transactions to choose timestamps in any order consistent with the object's local knowledge. Thus, we say that a history H is online hybrid atomic at X if, for every commit set C for H, and for every total order T consistent with Known(H 1 X), H 1 C 1 X is serializable in the order T. H is online hybrid atomic if, for all objects X, H is online hybrid atomic at X.
The following lemma is immediate:
Zf H is online hybrid atomic, H is also hybrid atomic.
The algorithm proposed in this paper guarantees online hybrid atomicity. The queue history shown earlier is hybrid atomic; in fact, each of its prefixes is online hybrid atomic. In a prefix in which either P or Q does not commit, Known(H) is empty, but the history is serializable in either order (P followed by Q or Q followed by P). Once P and Q commit, Known(H) contains the pair (Q, P). Once R executes an operation, Known(H) also contains the pairs (P, R) and (Q, R), and thus defines a total order Q-P-R on the three transactions; for a prefix containing one of R's operations to be online hybrid atomic, it needs to be serializable in the order Q-P-R, which, as argued earlier, it is.
CONFLICTS AND CONCURRENCY
This section describes our criteria for lock conflict. We begin with an informal overview of the locking algorithm itself, and then we present a formal definition of our notion of dependency. We conclude with a series of examples illustrating how dependency applies to a variety of common data types.
Overview
Our algorithm uses an approach similar to typical locking algorithms: an operation determines whether it can proceed based on whether other active transactions have executed conflicting operations. However, our notion of "conflicts" is less restrictive than in previous work; in addition, unlike most previous work we describe precisely how commits and aborts of transactions are handled.
The algorithm maintains three components for each object.
l Each transaction has an intentions list consisting of the sequence of operations to be applied to the object if the transaction commits. (As defined earlier, each operation consists of an invocation and a response value, where the invocation contains both the operation name and the values of arguments.) l The object's committed state reflects the effects of transactions known by the object to be committed. For now, it is convenient to treat the committed state as if it were simply the intentions lists for the committed transactions, arranged in timestamp order. In Section 6, we describe a more compact and efficient representation. l A set of locks associates each operation with the set of active transactions that have executed that operation. Locks are related by a symmetric conflict relation whose properties are discussed in the next section. We allow the lock conflict relation to take arguments and responses of operations into account, although it is not forced to do so.
When a transaction invokes an operation, it first constructs a uiew by appending its own intentions list to the committed state. It then chooses a response consistent with the view. Before appending the new operation to its intentions list, however, the transaction requests a lock for the operation. If another active transaction holds a conflicting lock, the lock request is refused, the response is discarded, and the invocation is later retried. (The invocation may return a different response when it is retried.) If the lock is granted, the operation is appended to the transaction's intentions list and the response is returned. (If the lock conflict relation being used does not take responses into account, the lock can be requested before choosing the response.) When a transaction commits, its intentions list is merged into the committed state in timestamp order. When a transaction commits or aborts, its locks are released and its intentions list is discarded.
Like most algorithms based on two-phase locking, the algorithms described here are subject to deadlock; the usual remedies (e.g., timeout or detection) can be used to resolve deadlocks when they occur or to avoid them.
As an example, consider the history involving a FIFO queue shown earlier. As shown below in Section 4.3, enqueue operations on a FIFO queue need not conflict. Thus, our algorithm allows concurrent enqueues, and in particular allows the history shown earlier. The order in which concurrently enqueued items should be dequeued is determined by the commit timestamps chosen by the concurrent transactions. Note that enqueues do not commute, so commutativity-based algorithms would not allow the same history.
Dependency Relations
The basic constraint governing lock conflicts is the notion of dependency: operations p and q cannot execute concurrently if one depends on the other. Let R be a binary relation between operations, and let h be an operation sequence. Let SSpec be the serial specification of some object X. DEFINITION 
A binary relation R on operations is a dependency relation for
SSpec if for all operation sequences h and k, and all operations p, such that 1. h=kandh*parelegal,and 2. for all q in k, (q, p) $ R h l p l k is legal.
In other words, if k is legal after h, p is legal after h, and no operation in k "depends on" p, then it should be legal to do k after p.
A dependency relation R is minimal if there is no R' c R that is also a dependency relation. We show below that an object may have several distinct minimal dependency relations. We prove in Section 5 that our algorithm is correct if and only if the lock conflict relation is a symmetric dependency relation.
The following lemmas discribe some important properties of dependency relations. LEMMA 4. Let R be a dependency relation for SSpec, h an operation sequence, and k, and k, operation sequences such that h l k, and h l k, are both legal. If no operation in k, depends on an operation in k2 (i.e., for all q, in k, and qz in k2, (q,, q2) # R), then h l k, l k, is legal.
Proof: By induction on the length of k,. The result is immediate if k, is empty. For the induction step, assume that k, = k; l p , and that the theorem holds for all sequences shorter than k,. The sequence h l k; is legal as a prefix of h l k,, h l k; l p is legal by hypothesis, and h l k; l k, is legal by the induction hypothesis.
Since no operation in k, depends on p, h l k; l p 9 k, = h l k, l k, is legal by Definition 3. 1 DEFINITION 5. A subsequence g of h is R-closed if whenever g contains an operation q of h it also contains every earlier operation p such that qRp. DEFINITION 6. A subsequence g of h is an R-view of h for q if g is R-closed, and if it includes every p in h such that qRp.
The next lemma is the key to proving the correctness of our algorithm. It says that to determine whether an operation is legal after a sequence of operations, it suffices to test whether it is legal after a subsequence that constitutes an R-view for the operation. LEMMA 7. Let R be a dependency relation for SSpec, and g and h sequences in SSpec such that g is an R-view of h for an operation q. If g l q is in SSpec, so is h l q.
ProoJ: We show by induction on the number of operations in h but not in g that h . q is legal. If h = g, the result is immediate. Assume g is missing at least one operation of h, and assume the result for views missing fewer operations. Let h = h, l p l h2, where p is the first operation in h but not in g. Let g = h, l g,, and g'=h,*p-g,.
The sequence h, l p is legal as a prefix of h, and h, l g, l q = g l q is legal by hypothesis. Since g is an R-view of h for q, no operation in g, l q depends on p; thus h, l p l g, l q = g' l q is legal by Definition 3.
It is easy to see that g' is an R-view of h for q. Thus, g' l q is legal. Since g' is missing fewer operations of h than g, it follows from the induction hypothesis that h l q is legal. 1
Examples
The definition of a dependency relation given in the previous section is not constructive: it merely gives a test for whether a given relation is a dependency relation. In this section we describe one way of deriving dependency relations more systematically from the serial specifications for objects, and give some examples of dependency relations for particular types of objects.
One way to define a dependency relation for an object is to say that an operation depends on any earlier operations that might invalidate it. Let h l p l k' l q be the shortest illegal prefix of h l p l k. The sequence h . k' l q is legal as a prefix of h l k, h l p l k' is legal by construction, but h l p l k' 9 q is illegal; hence q is invalidated by p, a contradiction. 1
While invalidated-by is a dependency relation, it need not be a minimal dependency relation. The remainder of this section describes dependency relations for certain simple objects, illustrating how the notion encompasses partial operations, non-deterministic operations, and operations' responses. We caution the reader not to confuse dependency relations and conflict relations. Dependency relations need not be symmetric; the conflict relations used in our algorithm, however, must be symmetric. A conflict relation will typically be constructed by taking the symmetric closure of a dependency relation, A File provides Read and Write operations:
where Read returns the most recently written value. The unique minimal dependency relation for File objects is shown in Table I , where an entry indicates that the row operation depends on the column operation when the indicated condition holds. This relation is the invalidated-by relation for a File object. In this example, a read operation depends on a write operation when their argument values are distinct. Note that write operations do not depend on one another. Thus, our algorithm can allow concurrent writes; when this happens, later transactions will read the value written by the transaction with the later commit timestamp. Our algorithm thus encompasses and generalizes the Thomas Write Rule [29] . (We note that a similar generalization of the Thomas Write Rule, using different terminology and without return values, appears in a paper by Hadzilacos and Papadimitriou
CW)
A FIFO Queue object has two operations, Enq and Deq, where Enq places an item at the end of a queue, and Deq removes and returns the item from the front 
Ins inserts an item in the Semiqueue, and Rem non-deterministically removes and returns an item from the Semiqueue. Like Deq, Rem returns only when there is an item to remove. (There may be an additional probabilistic guarantee, not captured by our functional specifications, that the item removed is likely to be the oldest one.) A Semiqueue object has the unique minimal dependency relation shown in Table IV . This dependency relation prevents Rem operations that return the same items from executing concurrently, but allows Ins operations to execute concurrently with Rem operations, and with one another. An Account provides Credit, Post, and Debit operations:
Credit increments the account balance by a specified amount. Post posts interest; for example, [Post(S), Ok] multiplies the account balance by 1.05. Debit attempts to decrement the balance. If the amount to be debited exceeds the balance, the operation returns with an exception, leaving the balance unchanged. Account has a unique minimal dependency relation shown in Table V . As in several of the previous examples, this relation is the invalidated-by relation for Account objects. An interesting aspect of this relation is that it enhances concurrency by taking operations' responses into account. For example, Credit locks need not conflict with locks for successful debits, although they must conflict with locks for attempted overdrafts, because increasing the account balance cannot invalidate a successful debit, but it can invalidate an Overdraft exception. If both kinds of debit operations were treated alike, debits and credits would have to be mutually This section presents a formal description of our locking algorithm, together with its proof of correctness. The description here is designed to emphasize the general strategy followed by the algorithm, and to highlight the differences with other locking algorithms. In Section 6, we discuss some issues that arise when designing an efficient implementation of this algorithm for a particular data type. In the appendix, we present an example implementation of an Account object, illustrating how properties of the data type can be used to design efficient implementations.
Given the serial specification SSpec of an object X, the algorithm described below ensures that all histories generated by the implementation of X are hybrid atomic. For ease of exposition, we do not refer specifically to X unless necessary; thus, when we refer to an "operation" we mean an operation of X, and similarly for events.
The Algorithm
A state machine is an automaton given by a set of states, a set of transitions, an initial state, and a partial transition function that maps (state, transition) pairs to states. If the transition function is defined on a given pair (s, t), we say that t is defined in s. The transition function can be extended in the obvious way to finite sequences of transitions. We say that a sequence of transitions is accepted by a machine M if it is defined in the initial state of M. We define the language of a machine M (denoted L(M)) to be the set of finite sequences of transitions that are accepted by M.
The algorithm is described by a state machine LOCK whose language consists of a set of event sequences. The machine uses a particular conflict relation, Conflict, to test whether one operation conflicts with another. We assume that Conflict is symmetric. To describe the algorithm, however, we do not need to make any other assumptions about the conflict relation used by the algorithm. In the next section we show that conflict relations derived from dependency relations are both necessary and sufficient to ensure correctness of the implementation, in the sense that every history in L(LOCK) is hybrid atomic.
A state of LOCK consists of four components: s.pending, s.intentions, s.committed, and s.aborted. s.pending is a partial function from transactions to invocation events. s.intentions is a total function from transactions to sequences of operations. s.committed is a partial function from transactions to timestamps. s.aborted is a set of transactions.
s.pending records pending invocations for transactions. Since each transaction is initially quiescent, s.pending is undefined for all transactions in the initial state of LOCK. s.intentions records the sequence of operations executed by each transac-tion. In the initial state of LOCK, s.intentions maps each transaction to the empty sequence. There are no "locks" recorded explicitly in this formal model of the algorithm; instead, the set of locks held by a transaction is implicit in the transaction's intentions list. s.committed allows us to tell which transactions have committed, and for each committed transaction records its timestamp. s.committed is initially undefined for all transactions. s.aborted records the set of transactions that have aborted, and is initially empty.
If s is a state of LOCK, define s.completed to be s.aborted u (P 1 s.committed # I}; s.completed thus consists of all transactions that have either committed or aborted. If Q $ s.completed, define View(Q, s) to be the operation sequence obtained by concatenating the intentions lists for all committed transactions in timestamp order, and then appending the intentions list for Q. 4 The transitions of LOCK are the events involving X; their preconditions and postconditions are described below. For brevity, we assume that all input histories are well formed. (Well-formedness could be checked explicitly by adding more state components and preconditions.) In the descriptions, the expression m[a + b], where m is a (possibly partial) function from domains A to B, a E A, and b E B, denotes the function identical to m except at a, which it maps to b.
In describing transitions, we write preconditions and postconditions for events, using the convention that s' denotes the state before the indicated event, and s denotes the state after the event. In addition, a state component that is not mentioned in the postcondition for an event is assumed to be unchanged by the occurrence of that event.
Invocation, commit, and abort events are inputs controlled by the transactions; thus, their preconditions are True. 5 The transition for each event is quite simple: the event is simply recorded in the state of LOCK. To return a response to a transaction, there are several requirements. First, the transaction must have a pending invocation. Second, the transaction must not have already completed. Third, the operation (consisting of the (invocation, response) pair) must be legal in the transaction's "view." Finally, the operation must not conflict with any other operation already executed by another active transation. If all these requirements are met, the response event can occur, causing the pending invocation to be removed from the state and the intentions list for the transaction to be updated to record the new operation.
Postcondition
Notice that s.intentions is retained for all transactions, including committed transactions. Thus, the "committed state" is simply the intentions lists for the committed transactions, arranged in timestamp order. This approach is clearly not practical. Nevertheless, it permits us to describe the algorithm in a simple and general manner. All other recovery methods seem to be special cases of this use of intentions lists, in the sense that they record no more information about the past in the state. In addition, some other recovery methods seem to require restricting concurrency more than is needed for intentions lists. In later sections, we show that there are simple optimizations that can be used in real implementations that make it possible to discard intentions lists for committed transactions.
The following scenario illustrates the operation of the algorithm. Assume that Conflict is a dependency relation. Suppose a transaction P executes an operation sequence g and commits. By the preconditions on response events, g is legal, so the history up to this point is hybrid atomic. Now suppose transactions Q and R execute the operation sequences h and k, respectively. For this to happen, g l h and g l k must both be legal; in addition, no operation in h can conflict with an operation in k. (These conditions are ensured by the preconditions on response events.) Now suppose that Q commits. By the constraints on timestamp generation, Q's timestamp must be larger than P's Since g l h is legal, the history is still hybrid atomic. Now suppose that R commits. We know that g l h and g l k are both legal; we must show either that g l h l k is legal or that g l k l h is legal, depending on whether R's timestamp is later or earlier than that of Q. Since no operation in k depends on an operation in h or vice-versa, the desired result follows from Lemma 4. In the next section, we present a rigorous proof of the correctness of the algorithm based on this intuition.
Note that the definition of a dependency relation requires that if p is legal after h, k is legal after h, and no operation in k depends on p, then h l p l k must be legal. One might think that the definition could use a single operation q instead of the operation sequence k. In fact, this is not sufficient. In terms of the proof, Lemma 4 would no longer hold. In terms of the algorithm, consider the scenario in the previous paragraph. Suppose that R's timestamp is later than that of Q. If the definition of a dependency relation used a single operation q in place of the operation sequence k, we would not be able to show that g l h l k is legal. If q is the first operation in k, we could show that g l h l q is legal, but we could not extend this to the rest of k.
Correctness Proof
We prove the following theorem: We show that if Conflict is a dependency relation, then every history in L(LOCK) is online hybrid atomic at X. Given Lemma 2, this suffices to prove Theorem 11.
We start with a simple lemma relating the state of LOCK after a history to the events in the history; the proof involves a simple induction on the length of histories in L(LOCK), and is omitted. The next lemma shows that active transactions do not conflict. LEMMA 13 . Let H be a history in L(LOCK), and let s be the state of LOCK after H. Zf P # Q, P $ Completed(H), and Q $ Completed(H), then no operation in s.intentions(P) conflicts with an operation in s.intentions(Q). 
Let H be a history in L(LOCK). Zf P und Q are transactions such that P # Q, P 4 Aborted(H), Q $ Aborted(H), (P, Q) 4 Precedes(H), and (Q, P) 4 Precedes(H), then no operation in OpSeq(H) P) conflicts with an operation in OpSeqW IQ).
Proof We make use of the previous lemma. Let G be the largest prefix of H that does not contain a commit event for P or Q, and let s be the state of LOCK after G. Neither P nor Q is in Completed(G). Therefore, by Lemma 13, no operation in s.intentions(P) conflicts with an operation in s.intentions(Q). By Lemma 12, OpSeq(G 1 P) = s.intentions (P) and OpSeq(G) Q) = s.intentions(Q), and consequently no operation in OpSeq(G 1 P) conflicts with an operation in WWG I Q).
We now claim that OpSeq(Gj P)= OpSeq(H( P) and OpSeq(GIQ) = OpSeq(H I Q). Since no operation in OpSeq(GI P) conflicts with an operation in OpSeq(GI Q), this suffices to prove the lemma. We show the claim by contradiction. We consider P; the proof for Q is symmetric. Suppose OpSeq(G I P) # OpSeq(H 1 P). Then OpSeq(H I P) is longer than OpSeq(G 1 P); let (i, r) be the first operation that occurs in OpSeq(H 1 P) that does not occur in OpSeq(G 1 P). It follows that the event (r, X, P) occurs in H and not in G. Furthermore, (r, X, P) must occur in H after a commit event for either P or Q, since G is the largest prefix of H that does not contain a commit event for either P or Q. The event (r, X, P) cannot occur after a commit event for P, since H is well formed; therefore, it occurs after a commit event for Q. This implies, however, that (Q, P) E Precedes(H), which contradicts one of the hypotheses of the lemma. 1
The next lemma is needed to show that View(Q, s) contains enough information to compute the response of an operation. LEMMA 15 . Let H be a history in L(LOCK), and let sH be the state of LOCK after H. Let C be a commit set for H, and let P be an active transaction in C, i.e., P E C -Committed(H). Finally, let T be a total order on transactions consistent with Known(H) such that (Q, P)ET for every Q~Committed(H).
Then View(P, sH) is a Conji'ict-closed subsequence of OpSeq(Serial(H I C, T)).
Proof: We first argue that View(P, sn) is a subsequence of OpSeq(Serial(H ( C, T)); we then show that it is Conflict-closed.
View(P, sn) is constructed by appending s,.intentions(Q), for each Q in Committed(H), indexed in the order given by s,.committed(Q), and then appending su. intentions( P). By Lemma 12, sH. intentions( R) = OpSeq(H I R) for every transaction R, and the order given by s,,committed(Q) is the same as TS(H). Thus, View(P, sH) = OpSeq(H 1 Q1) l .. l OpSeq(H 1 Q,) l OpSeq(H I P), where Qr, . . . . Q, are the transactions in Committed(H) in the order specified by TS(H). Since T is consistent with TS(H) and (Q, P) E T for every Q E Committed(H), the operations in View(P, sn) appear in the same order in OpSeq(Serial (H ( C, T) ). Thus, View(P, sn) is a subsequence of OpSeq(Serial(H I C, T)). Now we show that View(P, sn) is a Conflict-closed subsequence of OpSeq(Serial(H (C, T)). We proceed by induction on the length of H. The basis case, when H = .4, is immediate.
For the induction step, suppose H #/i, and assume that the theorem holds for all histories in L(LOCK) that are shorter than H. Then H = K l e for some history K in L(LOCK) and some event e. Let sx be the state of LOCK after K. By induction, the lemma holds for K and sK.
First, note that Precedes(K) s Precedes(H), TS(K) E TS(H), Committed(K) E Committed(H),
and Aborted(K) G Aborted(H). Thus, C and T satisfy the conditions of the lemma for K. By induction, View(P, sK) is a Conflict-closed subsequence of OpSeq(Serial (K (C, T) ). There are three cases to consider, depending on the type of e.
1. Suppose e is an invocation or abort event for some transaction R. Then su . intentions = sK. intentions, and sn , committed = sx . committed. Thus, View( P, sH ) = View(P, sx). If e is an abort event, R +! C. Otherwise, note that OpSeq throws away pending invocation events. In either case, OpSeq(Serial(H I C, T)) = OpSeq( Serial (K ( C, T) ). The result follows from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose e is a commit event for some transaction R. Since OpSeq throws away commit and abort events, OpSeq(Serial(H ( C, T)) = OpSeq(Serial(K I C, T)).
In addition, View(P, sH) is obtained from View(P, sx) by inserting OpSeq(H ( R) in the position determined by the timestamp for R. To show that View(P, sH) is a Conflict-closed subsequence of OpSeq(Serial (H 1 C, T) ), we must show that for every operation in View(P, sH), every earlier conflicting operation from OpSeq(Serial(H 1 C, T)) is also in View(P, su). By the induction hypothesis, this is true for operations that are in both View(P, su) and View(P, sK). The operations that are in View(P, sH) but not in View(P, sK) are the operations in sn.intentions(R). Suppose an operation r in OpSeq(Serial(H 1 C, T)) precedes some operation q in s,.intentions(R) and conflicts with it, and let S be the transaction that executed r. Then by Lemma 14 
and the constraints on T, (S, R) E Precedes(H). By the definition of Precedes(H), S~Committed(H),
and thus r appears in View( P, sH).
3. Finally, suppose that e is a response event (r, X, R). If P = R the result follows from the induction hypothesis and the precondition for e, since the operation added to s,.intentions (P) by e cannot conflict with operations executed by active transactions, and all other operations in OpSeq(Serial(H 1 C, T)) are in View(P, su).
If P and R are distinct, then View(P, sH)= View(P, sK). If R$C, then OpSeq(Serial(H ) C, T)) = OpSeq(Serial(K I C, T)), and the result follows by induction. Otherwise, OpSeq(Serial(H ( C, T)) differs from OpSeq(Serial(K 1 C, T)) in that it contains an extra operation for R. Since H is well formed, R $ Committed(H). By Lemma 14, an operation executed by R conflicts with an operation executed by another transaction S only if (S, R ) E Precedes(H). Therefore, every operation in OpSeq(Serial(H I C, T)) that conflicts with an operation q executed by R appears before q. The result follows by induction. 1
Now we are ready to prove the main result. For the induction step, suppose H #/i, and assume the result for all histories in L(LOCK) shorter than H. Then H = K l e for some history K in L(LOCK) and some event e. Since K is shorter than H, the theorem holds for K.
Note that all events in H (and K) involve only X; thus, H = H 1 X. Let sK be the state of LOCK after K. Now, let C be a commit set for H, and let T be a total order on transactions consistent with Known(H). To show that H is online hybrid atomic at X, it suffices to show that H 1 C is serializable in the order T, i.e., that OpSeq(Serial (H 1 C, T) ) is legal.
First, note that Precedes(K) 5 Precedes(H), TS(K) c TS(H), Committed(K) G Committed(H),
and Aborted(K) E Aborted(H). Thus, C and T satisfy the conditions of the definition of online hybrid atomicity for K. There are now two cases, depending on the type of e.
1. Suppose e is a commit, abort, or invocation event. Note that OpSeq throws away pending invocation events, commit events, and abort events. Thus, OpSeq( Serial(H 1 C, T)) = OpSeq( Seriai (K 1 C, T) ). Since the theorem holds for K, it also holds for H.
2.
Suppose that e is a response event (r, X, P). This is the difficult case. Note that if P $ C then H I C = K 1 C, and the result follows from the induction hypothesis. So assume that P EC.
Let Active = C -Committed(H). The sequence OpSeq(Serial(H 1 C, T)) can be written as h, l OpSeq(H 1 P) l h2, where h, = OpSeq(serial(H ) C,)) and h, = OpSeq(serial (H I C,) ), and C, and C, are chosen such that Committed(H) ECU, C, c Active, and P $ C, u C,. The sequences h, and h, respectively contain the operations of transactions ordered before and after P by T. C1 contains Committed(H) because T is consistent with Precedes(H), and since e = (r, X, P), it follows from the definition of Precedes(H) that (Q, P)E Precedes(H) for all Q E Committed(H).
Note that hi = OpSeq(Serial(K ( Cj, T)), since P 4 Ci. Since P is executing a response event, and H is well formed, no commit event for P appears in H. Also, C, is chosen such that C, c Active; thus, if Q E CZ, no commit event can appear in H for Q. It is an immediate consequence of the definitions that P and Q are unrelated by Precedes(H). Thus, by Lemma 14, no operation in OpSeq(H ) P) conflicts with an operation in OpSeq(H ) Q) for any Q E CZ. By the definition of h2, no operation in OpSeq(H 1 P) conflicts with an operation in h,.
We show that h, l h, and h, l OpSeq(H 1 P) are both legal. Since no operation in OpSeq(H) P) conflicts with an operation in h,, it then follows from Lemma 4 that h, l OpSeq(H 1 P) l h, is also legal, giving the desired result.
To show that hl l h,is legal, we note that it is simply OpSeq(Serial(H 1 C -(P},T)), which is the same as OpSeq(Serial(K ) C -{PI, T)). By the induction hypothesis, this sequence is legal.
To see that h, 9 OpSeq(H ( P) is legal, note that OpSeq(H 1 P) = OpSeq(K I P) l (i, Y) for some invocation i. By induction, h, l OpSeq(K 1 P) is legal, since it equals OpSeq(serial(K ) C, u (P>, T)). By the precondition for e, (i, r) does not conflict with any operation in OpSeq(H ) Q) for any Q E Active; thus, View(P, sK) contains all operations of h, l OpSeq(K I P) with which (i, r ) conflicts.
Since e is a response event for P, (Q, P) E Precedes(H) for all Q E Committed(H). Since T is consistent with Known(H), K, C, and T satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 15, which then implies that View(P, sK) is a Conflict-closed subsequence of h, l OpSeq(K I P). Furthermore, it contains all operations q of h, such that Kirhd C P t E on ic , since by the precondition for e, (i, r ) does not conflict with any operation of other active transactions. Therefore, View(P, sx) is a Conflict-view of h, l OpSeq(K I P) for (i, r ). By the precondition for e, View(P, sx) and View(P, sK) l (i, r) are both legal; hence by Lemma 7, so is h, l OpSeq(KI P) l (i, r) = h, l OpSeq(H I P). 1
The theorem above shows that a sufficient condition for LOCK to be correct is that the conflict relation be a dependency relation. We now show that this is also a necessary condition. THEOREM 17 . If the conflict relation used in LOCK is not a dependency relation for SSpec, then L(LOCK) contains a history that is not online hybrid atomic.
Proof If the conflict relation is not a dependency relation, choose sequences h and k and an operation p such that h l p and h l k are legal, no operation in k conflicts with p, and h l p l k is not legal. Consider the following scenario. Transaction P executes the operations in h and commits, Q executes p, and R executes the operations in k. By hypothesis, p does not conflict with any operations executed by R. If Q commits with a lower timestamp than R, the accepted history is not serializable in timestamp order. 1 6. COMPACTION Although the use of intentions lists facilitates our proofs, it has the disadvantage that object representations are neither compact nor efficient. For example, the size of a Queue representation has no relation to the number of items present in the 571/43/l-4 queue, and the item at the head of the queue must be found by a linear search. These problems can be alleviated by replacing intentions lists with more compact and efhcient representations. For example, we can replace a sequence of operations with the state (or version) that results from applying those operations to the initial state. For a Queue or Semiqueue, a version might be represented by an array or a linked list, while for an Account an integer cell might be used.
In this section, we describe a general technique for discarding intentions lists for committed transactions, replacing them with the version that represents their net effect. Each object keeps track of an operation sequence that forms a prefix for every view that will henceforth be assembled by any transaction. Each view is assembled by appending some sequence of intentions lists to the common prefix. When a committed transaction is sufficiently old, it can be "forgotten" by appending its intentions list to the common prefix, discarding both its intentions list and its commit timestamp. This common prefix is represented compactly as a version.
It is important to realize that a transaction cannot necessarily be forgotten as soon as it commits, because intentions lists must be appended to the common prefix in commit timestamp order, but commit events for concurrent transactions need not occur in timestamp order. Instead, care must be taken to ensure that a transaction is forgotten only when no active transaction can commit with an earlier timestamp. To recognize when it is safe to forget a transaction, we introduce some auxiliary components to our state machine. s.clock keeps track of the latest observed commit timestamp; it has an initial value of -co. s.bound is a partial function from transactions to commit timestamps, initially undefined for all transactions. If Q is an active transaction, s. bound(Q) is a lower bound on the possible commit timestamps that Q could choose when it commits.
We add the following postconditions to the transitions for LOCK: These additional components have no effect on L(LOCK); they serve only for bookkeeping. The idea is that we maintain a local clock that equals the maximum of the commit timestamps for transactions that have committed at the object. Since the commit timestamp order is required to be consistent with the precedes order at each object, the lower bound on the commit timestamp for an active transaction is increased to the current clock time whenever the transaction invokes an operation or has an operation return. If Q is active and (i, X, Q ) occurs, then by the constraints on commit timestamps the timestamp eventually chosen by Q must be greater than the commit timestamp for any transaction committed at X at the time that (i, X, Q) occurs, and similarly for (r, X, Q). Thus, the current clock time when (i, X, Q) or (r, X, Q) occurs does constitute a lower bound on the commit timestamp eventually chosen by Q.
Before describing details of how intentions lists are compacted, we present some properties of s. bound and s.clock. We start with a simple lemma relating these auxiliary components of LOCK to the other components. The proof involves a simple induction on the length of histories in L(LOCK), and is omitted. The following lemma describes how s. bound and s. committed give information about Known(H); in particular, it (together with the first part of Lemma 18) shows that s.bound(Q) is a lower bound on Q's eventual commit timestamp. LEMMA 19. Let P and R be transactions, H a history in L(LOCK), and s the state of LOCK after accepting H. Zf s.bound(R) and s.committed(P) are defined and s.committed(P) < s.bound(R), then (P, R) E Known(H).
ProofI By induction on the length of H. The result is immediate when H is empty. For the induction step, let H = G l e, where e is a single event, and let s' be the state after G, and s the state after H. Fix a pair of transactions P and R. If e is associated with any transaction other than P or R, the values of s.bound(R) and s.committed(P) are unaffected. The result holds vacuously if e is an abort, invocation, or response for P, because s.committed(P) is undefined. The result is also vacuous if e is an abort or commit for R, because s. bound(R) is undefined. If e is an invocation or response for R, then s. bound(R) = s . clock > s. committed(P), by Lemma 18. Moreover, (P, R) E Known(H), since R executed an invocation or response after P committed. Suppose e is (commit(t), X, P). If t > s.bound(R), the result holds vacuously. Otherwise, by Lemma 18, there exists a transaction Q such that s'.committed(Q) = s'.bound(R).
By the induction hypothesis, (Q, R) E Known(G), and since Known(G) E Known(H), (Q, R) E Known(H). Suppose s.committed(P) = s.committed(Q); then P = Q (by well-formedness), and by induction (P, R)E Known(H). (This can happen only if multiple commit events occur for P.) Otherwise, s.committed(P) < s.committed(Q), so (P, Q) E TS(H), and thus by transitivity we have that (P, R) E Known(H). 1
Now we describe how intentions lists are compacted. Let s be a state of LOCK. Informally, the horizon time for s is a lower bound on the commit timestamp that can be chosen by an active transaction. The result of concatenating the intentions list of all transactions whose commit timestamps precede the horizon time is certain to be a prefix of every transaction's view, and thus can be compacted into a version. More formally : DEFINITION 20. s.horizon=max(-co,min(min(s.bound(P)Is.bound(P)#I}, max{s.committed(P)Is.committed(P)#I}))
In other words, the horizon time is either --co (if there are no active or committed transactions), or it is the earlier of the earliest bound for an active transaction and the latest commit timestamp for a committed transation. If there are no active transactions, then the horizon timestamp is the largest commit timestamp. If there is an active transaction, however, all we know about its eventual commit timestamp is that it will be later than the recorded lower bound for the transaction, so we should not compact intentions lists for committed transactions whose timestamps are later than that lower bound.
Let Qr , . . . . Q, be the sequence of transactions for which s.committed is defined, indexed in timestamp order, and let Qi, . . . . Qk be the subsequence of transactions such that s.committed(Qi) < s. horizon. We define the following "auxiliary" components. DEFINITION Clearly, s.common is a prefix of s. permanent. To compute the response to an invocation for Q, we need to compute View(s, Q). If Q is an active transaction, then View(s, Q) = s.permanent l s.intentions(Q), of which s.common is a prefix. Thus, s.common can be compacted into a single version. To show that this is true, we show that s.common grows monotonically. LEMMA 23 . Let H = G l e be a history in L(LOCK), and let sG and sH be states of LOCK after G and H. Then so.common is a prefix of su .common.
Proof: If e is an invocation, response, or abort event for Q, then su.committed = s,.committed, and sn. bound(Q) either equals so. bound(Q), becomes larger than sG. bound(Q), or becomes 1. Regardless, s,.horizon 2 so. horizon. Since sH. committed = so. committed, so. common is a prefix of sn. common.
If e is a commit event for Q, there are two cases. If e is the first commit event for Q, so socommon is a prefix of sn.common. Otherwise, so.common = sn. common. 1
The following theorem follows easily from the above lemma. THEOREM 24. Let G and H he histories in L(LOCK) such that G is a prefix of H, and let sG and sH be states of LOCK after G and H. Then SG.common is a prefix of sH. common.
Since s.common grows monotonically, we can represent it by keeping a version s.version and periodically computing a new version by applying (in commit timestamp order) the intentions lists for transactions P with s.bound(P) < s. horizon to s. version.
It is not always necessary to keep explicit track of transactions' lower bounds. For example, if one operation conflicts with every other operation, as Deq does in Table II (ignoring the argument and response values) , then all committed transactions can be forgotten whenever a dequeuing transaction commits or aborts. Transaction Q may acquire a Deq lock only if no other active transaction has executed any operations, implying that s. bound(P) = 1 for all P distinct from Q, and hence s. horizon = s. bound(Q). The committed state of a queue can be represented as a single committed version together with a set of intentions consisting entirely of Enq operations. Thus, the size of the representation would be proportional to the number of elements in the queue.
The Queue conflict relation shown in Table III can also be specially optimized. Here, all operations that do not conflict commute, thus a transaction can be forgotten as soon as it commits at an object. The resulting scheme is equivalent to a commutativity-based locking scheme of Weihl [30, 321. 7 . DISCUSSION As mentioned above, the precedes order captures potential "information flow" between transactions. Most mechanisms based on two-phase locking ensure that transactions are serializable in every total order consistent with precedes, a property known as dynamic atomicity [30, 331 . Conflict-based concurrency control mechanisms for dynamic atomicity include those proposed by Eswaran et al. Korth [17] , Bernstein et al. [2] , and Weihl [30, 321 . These mechanisms are all based on a notion of commutatiuity. Informally, two operations commute if executing them in either order always yields the same responses and the same final object state. If two operations do not commute, their locks must conflict.
We now show that "failure to commute" is a dependency relation, although not necessarily a minimal dependency relation. It follows that our algorithm is less restrictive than the commutativity-based algorithms cited above; our algorithm can achieve at least as much concurrency. Our examples show that lock conflict relations induced by dependency may be weaker than or incomparable to those induced by the commutativity-based algorithms.
We use the following notion of commutativity taken from [30] , a notion that encompasses both partial and non-deterministic operations. (This notion of commutativity is called forward commutatiuity in [32] .) DEFINITION 25. Two operation sequences h and h' are equieffectioe if they cannot be distinguished by any future computation: h s g is legal if and only if h' l g is legal for all operation sequences g. DEFINITION 
26
. Two operations p and q commute if for all operation sequences h, whenever ha p and h l q are both legal, then h l p l q and h l q l p are legal and equieffective. Proof: By induction on the number of operations in k. The result is trivial when k is empty. For the induction step, suppose k = k' l q, where q is a single operation, and assume the result holds for k'. Then by induction, h l p l k' is legal and equieffective to h l k'op. By hypothesis, h l k'* q (= h l k) is legal. Since p and q commute, h l k' l p l q is legal and equieffective to h l k' l q l p. The latter is just h l k l p. The former is equieffective to h l p l k' l q, since h l k' l p is equieffective to h l p l k'. But this is just h l p l k. 1 THEOREM 28. "Failure to commute" is a dependency relation.
Proof: Let NC denote failure to commute. Let h and k be operation sequences and let p be an operation such that h l k and h l p are legal, and such that for all q in k, (q, p) # NC. It suffices to show that h l p l k is legal. This is immediate from Lemma 27. 1 Lock conflict relations induced by dependency may be weaker than or incomparable to those induced by commutativity. For example, consider an Account object. Commutativity-based algorithms impose a lock conflict relation that includes (at least) the conflicts shown in Table VI . This conflict relation permits strictly less concurrency than the symmetric closure of the dependency relation shown in Table V . The additional restrictions arise because the commutativitybased algorithms require Post operations to conflict with Credit and Debit operations, while the dependency-based algorithms do not. In the Queue example, by contrast, the commutativity-based algorithms induce lock conflicts identical to those induced by the minimal dependency relation shown in Table III . Here, however, the commutativity-based algorithms do not permit the incomparable conflict relation induced by the minimal dependency relation in Table II .
In addition to requiring fewer conflicts than commutativity-based algorithms, our work also generalizes most other work on type-specific two-phase locking by allowing the responses returned by an operation to be used in choosing the appropriate lock, and by permitting operations to be partial and non-deterministic. Some other algorithms (e.g., see [ZS]) achieve the effect of using information about responses by acquiring a restrictive lock when an operation starts running, and then "down-grading" the lock depending on how the operation actually executes. The resulting algorithm violates two-phase locking, and as a result ad hoc correctness arguments are usually given. Our algorithm shows how the responses of operations, as well as names and arguments, can be used systematically to determine the locks needed. (The commutativity-based algorithms in [30, 321 also permit response information to be used in choosing locks.)
In addition, other algorithms (except for those in [30, 321) require operations to be total and deterministic. Partial operations are important for modeling producerconsumer relationships, in which one transaction is consuming data produced by another. Such situations, while perhaps uncommon in traditional database applications, are more common in general distributed or object-oriented systems. Similarly, non-deterministic operations are an important source of concurrency; compare, for example, the dependency relations for Queue and SemiQueue shown earlier. (Non-determinism can also increase availability; see [ 111 for an example.)
Another way in which our work differs from most other work on type-specific concurrency control is in the treatment of recovery. With the exception of [30, 32] , the other work ignores recovery.
A more general form of hybrid atomicity is defined in [30, 331 , permitting readonly transactions to be treated specially, as in the multi-version algorithms in [4, 5, 311 . Timestamps for read-only transactions are chosen when they start, while timestamps for other transactions are chosen when they commit. This algorithm is the origin of the term "hybrid atomicity," since the algorithms combine aspects of dynamic atomic algorithms (such as common two-phase algorithms) and static atomic algorithms (such as Reed's multiversion algorithm). In fact, hybrid atomicity is upward compatible with dynamic atomic algorithms: dynamic atomic algorithms guarantee serializability of committed transactions in all total orders consistent with Precedes(H); since TS(H) is one such order, global atomicity is still obtained when dynamic and hybrid atomic objects are combined in a single system.
Our results suggest that dependency is a more fundamental property than commutativity for understanding concurrency control for typed objects. In addition, the notion of a dependency relation arises in a variety of other related contexts6 The constraints on the availability realizable by quorum consensus replication [ 111 can be expressed in terms of dependency relations. Dependency relations also form the basis for validation in type-specific optimistic concurrency control mechanisms [12] , as well as type-specific locking schemes based on multi-version timestamping [ 131, and schemes that provide high levels of availability in the presence of partitions [ 141.
To summarize, we have defined a new locking algorithm that permits more concurrency than existing commutativity-based algorithms. It permits operations to be both partial and non-deterministic, and it permits responses of operations to be used in choosing locks. The algorithm exploits type-specific properties of objects; we have shown how to define a necessary and sufficient set of constraints on lock conflicts directly from the data type specification. The algorithm is optimal in the sense that no hybrid atomic locking scheme can permit more concurrency.
APPENDIX: AN EXAMPLE IMPLEMENTATION
To illustrate how our locking algorithm might be used in practice, this Appendix describes an implementation of the Account data type using Avalon/C+ + [15] , a programming language that supports hybrid atomicity. We assume some familiarity with C+ + [28] . Although Avalon/C+ + supports nested transactions, this example assumes only a single-level transaction model.
We start by describing the subsidiary data types used by the Account implementation. Avalon programmers do not manipulate transaction timestamps directly. Instead, Avalon provides a trans-id data type to permit the programmer to test serialization orders at run-time.' class trans-id : public recoverable { private :
. . . // representation public:
trans-id( ); // constructor boo1 operator = = (transid& who); // equal? boo1 operator < (trans-id & who); // serialized before? . . . // other operations 6 The detinition of a dependency relation given in this paper is stated differently from that in other papers by Herlihy, but is easily shown to be equivalent.
' Avalon/C + + defines boo1 to be an enumeration type with TRUE set to 1 and FALSE set to 0.
A transaction generates an identifier by a call to new:
transid* who = new tram-id;
Transaction identifiers are partially ordered by the overloaded operators " > " and " < ." If transactions P and Q respectively create identifiers tl and t2, then the expression t1 <t2
evaluates to true if and only if (P, Q) E Known(H), where H is the current history. An account object maintains lock information in a lock The account operations are represented by the enumeration type lock-type. An empty lock table is created by declaring a variable of type lock-tab, and the define operation marks two operations as conflicting. The conflict operation takes a lock type and a transaction identifier, and returns true if no other transaction holds a conflicting lock. The grant operation grants a lock for a specified operation, and release discards all locks held by a transaction.
The net effect of a transition that executes multiple Credits, Debits, and Posts is to replace the balance b by the atline transformation m*b + a for some m and a. Each transaction's intention is recorded in the following struct : struct intent (float mul; float add; intent(float m, float a) {mul=m; add=a;}; 1;
The last component defines a constructor operation for initializing the struct. The intention associated with each transaction is kept in a table: class intent-tab { // map trans -+ intention. private :
. . . J/ representation public: intent-tab( ); // constructor intent lookup (trans-id* who); // return intention void insert(trans-id* who, // bind trans to intention intent what); void discard(trans-id* who); // discard intention >; Lookup returns a transaction's current intention. If none exists, it returns an intention with multiplicative and additive components I.0 and 0.0, respectively.
Intentions for committed transactions are discarded using the horizon time scheme described in Section 6. Each active transaction keeps track of the latest committed transaction guaranteed to be serialized before itself. This information is kept in a table: class bound-tab ( // map trans -+ lower bound private :
. . // representation public:
bound-tab( ); // constructor void insert(trans-id* who, // register new lower bound trans-id* bnd); void discard(trans-id* who); // discard lower bound trans-id* min( ); // horizon transaction 1; Transactions that are committed but not yet forgotten are kept in a heap.
class id-heap { // sorted heap of transactions private:
id-heap( ); // constructor trans-id* top( ); // return oldest transaction trans-id* remove( ); // remove oldest transaction void insert(trans-id* who); // insert transaction boo1 empty( ); // is heap empty? 1; This data type provides operations for creating an empty heap, inserting a transaction identifier in the heap, and observing or removing the oldest (i.e., minimal with respect to "c") identifier in the heap.
We are now ready to examine the Account implementation itself. The "public subatomic" declaration means that this data type ("class" in C + + terminology) inherits certain operations necessary for short-term synchronization and for ensuring that the object is recorded properly on stable storage. The object's internal representation is given by the fields following the keyword private. The locks component keeps track of the locks, intent-tab records transactions' intentions, bal is the account balance left by "forgotten" committed transactions, and committed keeps track of transactions that have committed but have not yet been forgotten. The internal function forget uses the clock and bounds fields to implement the compaction scheme described in Section 6. The internal function sufficient determines whether the balance covers an attempted debit by a particular transaction.
When an account is created, the account constructor is invoked: To ensure proper crash recovery, all modifications to the object must occur inside a pinning statement. Most of the object's members are implicitly initialized. The clock is initialized with the creator's identifier, the balance is initialized to zero, and the lock table is initialized with the conflict relation shown in The whenswitch statement is a generalization of the when statement that replaces the boolean expression with an expression of an enumeration type. Here, Debit calls upon the internal procedure sufJicient, which returns YES if the account balance covers the debit, NO if the debit should be refused, and MAYBE if lock conflicts leave the account status ambiguous.
The code for sufficient appears below. The clock is advanced, the committing transaction's locks are released, its lower bound is discarded, the transaction is marked as committed. The internal function forget is called to forget committed transactions:
void account : : forget( ) ( transsid* horizon = bounds.min( );
